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BOOK REVIEWS
at the present time not fully understood.'6 How-
ever, the systematic study of decisions made during
"1 A recent study documenting the consequences of
bringing about change in prison is Studt, Messinger,
and Wilson, C-UNM: SEARCH FOR COMMUNrTY IN
PRISON (1968).
the implementation of programs, as well as an
ongoing documentation of participant responses
to various aspects of the program, should do much
toward our understanding of some of the conse-
quences. The Inmate Development Project rep-




Upon this occasion the Journal wishes to express
its deep appreciation to the former Editor of this
book review section, Dr. C. Ray Jeffery, Professor
of Public Administration of New York University.
Professor Jeffery served with distinction as our
Criminology Book Review Editor from June, 1963
through June, 1969. He resigned when he became
Editor of Criminologica, a publication of the Ameri-
can Society of Criminology.
We extend our best wishes to Professor Jeffery as
Editor of Criminologica, and also in his new teaching
position as Professor of Criminology at Florida
State University.
As a successor to Professor Jeffery we were
fortunate to secure the services of Professor
Bernard Cohen, Queens College, City University
of New York.
F. E. I.
LAW AND TACTIcs iN ExCLUsIoNARY HEARINGS.
By Thomas P. Abbott, John C. Cratsley, Steven L.
Engelberg, Daniel G. Grove, Peter D. Manahan,
Bruce P. Saypol. Washington D. C.: Coiner
Publications, Ltd., 1969. Pp. 349. $20.
Preparation for trial is, as any lawyer who has
tried a case will attest, quite a demanding task.
There is the detailed factual investigation, analysis
and review. The trial lawyer must be prepared to
consider each move from a strategic point of view.
Physical and mental acuity is essential for per-
formance. To all of these rigors of pre-trial prepara-
tion-which the more literary might liken to a
boxer's pre-fight training-is added the require-
ment of knowledge of the law: Not just a passing
acquaintance with nebulous concepts, but often
recollection of case names, chapter and verse.
Those who either cannot remember all the cases,
chapter and verse, or who, without some sort of
crutch, would not remember, seek works like Law
and Tactics in Exclusionary Hearings.' This breed
of trial lawyer is often easily discernible--a large
document case, a brief case bulging or an arm load
of dog-eared books are his hallmark. Law and
Tactics is written for him. This review will seek to
tell him whether or not that work should be added
to his collection.
I do not suggest that the only use to which Law
and Tactics might be put is the trial lawyer's travel-
ing or stationary library. As a starting point for
basic research on many federal constitutional
questions, its coverage is pointed, succinct and
surprisingly complete, even if the analysis is short
and therefore sometimes lacking in depth. For any
lawyer faced, either for the first time or after a long
hiatus, with a criminal case, Law and Tactics will
serve as basic text, quick refresher and summary
advance sheet.2 And, as its predecessor, Law and
Tactics in Federal Criminal Cases,3 the new Law and
Tactics contains ample practical aids, even includ-
ing suggested questioning for direct and cross
'Sometimes hereinafter the book will be referred to
simply as Law and Tactics.2 If the supplement to the text is done well, Law and
Tactics will continue to provide current basic analysis.
If, however, the supplement is late in preparation, de-
layed in publication and is a sometime thing, the value
of this w ork will diminish significantly. There are many
pages of valuable trial practice materials in the text,
including examples of direct and cross examination
which will long be useful for trial initiates and veterans.
But without current substantive coverage, the unique
worth of the work would lessen.
3 Shadoan, Law and Tactics in Federal Criminal
Cases (1964) from the same Program which produced
Law and Tactics in Exclusionary Hearings, the E.
Barrett Prettyman Legal Intern Program. The Program
is described in the Preface to the new work.
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examination on a number of points. As Judge
Prettyman notes with obvious agreement in his
Foreword, the authors say they have written a
"cookbook" on the subject of exclusion. Thus any-
one who, steps into -the "kitchen," or who is con-
templating the state of this particular legal "culi-
nary" art, has potential use for this book.
Law and Tactics undertakes to tell the reader
about the law which excludes from use at trial in
criminal cases evidence obtained illegally. After
stating "why" such rules exist, examining the
rationale and origin of "exclusionary rules", the
authors tell "when" to try to invoke the rules,
"who" can do so and, of course, "how" to do it.
The how-to-do-it portion of the book covers the
writings, if any, necessary to pursue the matter,
and the oral and eidentiary presentation of the
matter in court. Then specific kinds of exclusionary
problems are discussed and analyzed with examples
of testimony given.
Law and Tactics in Exclusionary Hearings is
written by lawyers practicing in the courts of the
District of Columbia. Although the material is of
far more general application, the point of view is
clearly one colored by practice in the District.4
Fundamental limitations by reason of the nature of
the subject matter, and which are obvious, are:
only criminal or criminally related cases would in-
volve exclusionary rule questions and most of the
cases and rules are federally based. In fact the
authors tend to cite mostly D. C. Circuit cases.
Not too long after obtaining a copy of Law and
Tactics in Exclusionary Hearings, I had need to
prepare a motion to suppress in a federal criminal
case. One of the possibilities for inclusion in the
motion was the asserted invalidity of the search
involved because of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109,
which requires that officers announce their author-
4 In the District of Columbia courts a preliminary
hearing is commonplace. It is freely given, rarely
waived, and, by judicial determination, may be had
even after indictment if wrongly denied. See Dancy v.
United States, 124 App. D.C. 58 361 F.2d 75 (1966),
Blue v. United States, 119 U.S. App. D.C. at 315, 342
F.2d 894 (1964) cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965). The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has overtly acknowledged that the
discovery value of a preliminary hearing may be enough
to warrant such a result. Blue v. United States, 119 U.S.
App. D.C. at 322, 342 F.2d at 901. This is not the case
in most other federal districts or in most state courts
where preliminary hearings remain the exception rather
than the rule.
It should be noted that the recently enacted Federal
- Magistrates Act will require a preliminary hearing in
most cases in federal district court. Federal Magistrates
Act, Section 303, U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5264,5275 (1968).
ity and purpose when entering premises to conduct
a search. Although I had not yet reached that point
in Law and Tactics, I quickly found the place using
the index.
My case had two elements which, I vaguely
remembered, were possible "hookers." First, the
search was made after the officers had executed an
arrest warrant. Section 3109, by its terms, only ap-
plies to the manner of executing search warrants.
Second, initial access to the premises arguably was
had by a "ruse." The question was, assuming the
potential applicability of the statute to the case,
whether gaining entry by a ruse constitutes a
breaking within the meaning of Section 3109.
A quick glance at the first paragraphs of the sec-
tion of Law and Tactics dealing with this subject 5
made it clear that Section 3109 had been applied
even where no search warrant was involved. Al-
though there was no extensive analysis of this
fundamental point, the quotations and footnotes
gave adequate information to permit assessment
of the state of the law and to draft the motion.'
The question of entry by ruse was dealt with at
the very end of the section, where consent was con-
sidered in relation to the "breaking" necessary to
violate Section 3109.7 Citing two D.C. Circuit
cases, the distinction was drawn between "overt
police fraud," which would render "consent" in-
valid,8 and "silent cooperation in a stratagem to
gain entry," which would not invalidate the "con-
sent". Again, while not exhaustive, this coverage
was sufficient to acquaint or refresh the reader
with the basic principles involved in the issue and
provide adequate citation, chapter and verse.' 0
5 Law and Tactics, 207-219.6 Id. at 207, nn. 201-203. Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301 (1958), the leading case on this point, is
quoted at length in the text. Also cited and quoted are
Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968), the
most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on this
point, and Keiningham v. United States, 109 U.S. App.
D.C. 272, 287 F.2d 126 (1960).7 Id. at 219.
8 Id. at 219, n. 225, citing Gatewood v. United States,
93 U.S. App. D.C. 226, 209 F.2d 789 (1953).
9Id. at 219, n. 226, citing Cecil Jones v. United
States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 14,304 F.2d 381, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 852 (1962).
0 Actually, subsequent research revealed that in
Sabbath the Supreme Court alluded to the "ruse"
question, stating: "We do not deal here with entries
obtained by ruse, which have been viewed as involv-
ing no 'breaking'." Sabbath v. U.S., 391 U.S. 585, 590,
n.6 (1968).
It is of course difficult to conjecture what way the
Court would go if faced with the question. However,
this reference and the other cases dealing with the
question are not referred to in Law and Tactic;. This is




Other instances of usefulness of this work would
be easy to write about, and will be experienced by
those who have access to Law and Tactics. The
sample testimony, the hints for preparation (very
much like hints in a cookbook on how to season the
dish) and the many check-lists which one may lift
from the pages combine to make this one of the






CONSTITUONAL LITATIONS ON EvIDEN E IN
CRIMINAL CASES: By B. James George, Jr. New
York: Practising Law Institute, 1969. Pp. 413.
$15.00
Professor George has written a text on the con-
stitutional rules affecting the admissibility of evi-
dence," and a good text on that subject has long
been needed. The field is practically empty of
decent, comprehensive treatments. Whether this
book adequately fills the void is the subject of this
review.
There are many favorable comments that can be
made about the work. It is well written, succinct
and lucid in its statement of the relevant doctrines.
It is reasonably comprehensive in its coverage,
touching, at least, upon practically all of the
significant constitutional rules and their offspring.
Professor George rarely misstates a case or inac-
curately sets forth a statement of law. The book
thus is a good source of barebones statements of
the relevant judicial decisions a starting point for
research, analysis and thinking about the subtle
problems involved in this area of the law. Perhaps
that is the task Professor George has set out to
accomplish. If so, he has succeeded. My criticisms
of the book, in the main, highlight omissions,
things he might have included but did not. Perhaps
it is unfair to chastise an author for not doing
something that he probably did not set out to do.
But the fact is that the need for a work on this
subject that does more than this book remains
unfulfilled.
At the outset, a critical comment should be made
for which Professor George can hardly be held
responsible. He has attempted to describe an area
of the law where change has been occurring so
IThe book is slightly misnamed since it does include
material on the admissibility of evidence in non-criminal
cases. Pp. 110-114.
rapidly that it is difficult to keep up with the flood
of cases. He rightly calls this book a 1969 edition,
and a serious effort has clearly been made to include
the most recent cases up to the date of publication.
Since that date, however, the Supreme Court has
handed down decisions in Alderman,2 Spinelli,'
and Chinzel,4 to name just a few significant recent
cases that have developed and changed the rules
described. Also state and lower Federal courts have
issued a torrent of cases in this field. Thus, for
example, Chimel works a major change in the law
of search and seizure. Professor George had the
foresight to predict some change of this sort,
though his reading of the portents was not entirely
accurate. What is the author of a work of this sort
to do, however? A book of this sort will inevitably
be slightly or even greatly outdated by the time of
publication. The solution, partial as it may be, is to
regularly and frequently update the book. I assume
that this is what Professor George has in mind
when he calls this the 1969 edition and that we can
look forward to annual or biennial editions.
A problem related to the difficulty of keeping up
with the flood of cases is that Professor George has
omitted a fair amount of case authority that was in
fact decided in time to be included in the book.
Admittedly, in a work of this brevity, he could not
include everything. Having recently reviewed the
California authorities on this subject, 5 I am sensi-
tive to the difficulties of trying to cover every case
but am also acutely aware of the fact that he has
omitted some very important California decisions.
An author of a work of this sort does have an
obligation to select carefully those cases he does
cite and discuss. It is hard to understand, for ex-
ample, why he devotes most of a paragraph to an
obscure Federal district court case of "dubious"
authority6 on the issue of the prosecutor demand-
ing handwriting exemplars and yet fails to discuss
or even cite cases, such as People v. Hines, People v.
Varnum' and People v. Spencer.'
More importantly, his handling of significant
and subtle, though subsidiary, doctrinal issues
tends to be offhand and full of gaps. The reader
2Alderman v. United States, 37 U.S. Law Week
4189 (1969).
3 SpineUi v. United States, U.S. (1969).
4 Chimel v. California, U.S. (1969).
5 Abrams and Baldwin, Significant Recent California
Criminal Law Developments (U. of Calif. Extension,
1969).
6 P. 204, United States v. Green, 282 F. Supp. 373
(S.D. Ind. 1968).
766 Adv. Cal. 343 (1967).
'166 Cal. 2d 808 (1967).
9 66 Cal. 2d 158 (1967).
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who looks to this book for an adequate handling of
the standing problem, for example, will be woefully
disappointed. He does not deal at all with the
dilemma argument set forth in Jones v. United
States'° or relate the.decision in Simmons v. United
States" to that argument. He fails to discuss any of
the complex implications of Wong Sunw" for the
standing area (including, for example, the notion
that there must be illegality as to the claimant).
And he even mis-cites Wang Sun on the problem of
a co-defendant's standing." Most inexcusably, he
fails to recognize that the standing issue may vary
markedly depending on whether the constitutional
violation involves a search and seizure, a confes-
sion, an overheard statement, or a lineup. This is
perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that he
does not discuss or even cite the seminal case of
People v. Varnum.11
His treatment of the retroactivity issue, though
at least recognizing that different rules apply to
different constitutional doctrines, is, however, also
inadequate. A reader not previously familiar with
the decision in Linkletter v. Walker15 would not
know that the decision "that Mapp was not to be
applied retroactively" 16 meant that Mapp did
have a limited retroactive dimension insofar as it
applied to all cases pending on direct appeal at the
time of the Mapp decision." He does not mention
that some of the states have applied different
retroactivity rules" than those announced by the
U.S. Supreme Court. In many instances, he fails tQ
note the crucial date involved. For example, he
tells us the dates of Escobedo and Miranda9 but
not the exact date of Mapp. Finally, though
generally critical of any retroactive application of
new doctrine,0 he gives us no critical analysis of
the various retroactivity rules that have been
articulated.
Professor George's discussion of poisonous taint
and harmless error suffers from similar weaknesses.
I fear that in making the inevitable choice between
the scope of coverage of issues, on the one hand,
and the depth of his treatment of particular sub-
sidiary doctrines, on the other, Professor George
"0 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
2 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
-2371 U.S. 471 (1963).
" P. 130.
14 Supra, note 8.
15 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
" P. 98.
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" See People v. Rollins 65 Cal. 2d 681 (1967).
P. 295.
20 See, for example, p.,217.
has tended to opt for superficiality. 'the balance
between coverage and depth is always a difficlt
one, but I would have expected a somewhat more
sophisticated analysis of such issues, for this is
where the legal "action" has really been during the
last decade.
In general, that discussion of substantive issues
that he does engage in is reasonably detached and
objective. There are, of course, some matters about
which reasonable law professors can disagree. For
example, I have grave doubts about the continuing
vitality of consensual eavesdropping cases such as
On Lee" and Lopez22 in light of how the Supreme
Court has treated the Osborn decision in its subse-
quent opinions in Berger" and Katz. Although
there was a consensual eavesdropping in Osborn,
the Court in subsequent opinions has relied on the
fact that there was the equivalent of a search war-
rant present in that case. It would therefore not be
at all surprising to find the Court in the near future
requiring a warrant or its equivalent in consensual
eavesdropping cases. Professor George has not
hesitated to make similar predictions himself
regarding other issues. His handling of the consen-
sual eavesdropping cases, however, leads me to
believe that he disagrees with my reading of them.21
Predictions such as this, are, in any event, always
unsafe, particularly at a time when the personnel
of the Supreme Court is changing.
In one or two areas, Professor George, in my
judgment, jumps the track. First, he makes some
rather extreme statements about the effect of
Miranda. For example: "[Flor if there were a de-
rivative evidence rule ... [applied to confessions]
the use of the confession as an investigating tool
would disappear for practical purposes." 26
Surely this is a statement not justified by any
available empirical evidence. Indeed, Professor
George fails even to cite any of the recent field
studies on the impact of Miranda." Second, he also
devotes a large amount of space28 to an issue that
I should have thought was now well-settled29-the
21 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 477 (1952).
22 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
21 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
24Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25 See pp. 148-149.
26 P. 295.
2 For example, Note, Interrogation in New Haven-
The Impact of Miranda, 76 Yale LJ. 1519 (1967);
Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. of
Pitts. L.Rev. 1 (1967).
Is Consult Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecu-





viability of the exclusionary rule. His analysis of
the assumptions underlying the rule amount to a
criticism that it is not really effective in some con-
texts. It is quite a jump, however, from that un-
doubtedly sound conclusion to his implied state-
ment that the rule ought to be junked. He makes
the point-and it is well taken-that judicial
statements of the substantive constitutional rules
are too often obscure and complex. This is surely a
matter about which the courts and all lawyers
should be concerned. But he follows this with a
statement so extreme that I can only hope that he
did not mean to say it:... even if the judicial
statement were clear, there is still no effective
means by which the import of this language can be
meaningfully communicated to police officers who
are to bring their conduct into accord with it." 30
To despair of our ability to communicate to the
police the constitutional rules they are supposed to
follow is to abandon entirely whatever protections
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were designed
to provide. Surely Professor George could not have
intended such a conclusion. His treatment of the
subject would have been more complete had he
pointed out that an important by-product of the
exclusionary rule has been the development, in
recent years, of instructional courses and the
preparation of manuals in many of our larger
police departments for teaching these constitu-
tional doctrines. Certainly, better, more sophisti-
cated efforts in this direction must be made. A
discussion of practical ways in which this might be
accomplished would have made a much more posi-
tive contribution than Professor George's essen-
tially negative attack.
Despite such criticisms, the book remains a good,
comprehensive, though not deep, treatment of the
relevant constitutional doctrines. It points the way
toward the type of text that still remains to be





Cru2E AiD INSANITY IN ENGLAMN: TuE HIsToRI-
CAL PERSPECTIVE (Vol. 1). By Nigel Walker.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968.
Pp. xiv, 302. S8.95.
Madness-western man's cruelty, ineptitude
and stupidity in dealing with it-is the subject
0 P. 337.
matter of this the first of two volumes devoted to
the problems and issues presented by the mentally
ill person from pre-Norman England to the present
decade. The insanity defense as articulated through
the writings of Hale, Bracton, Glanville,.and the
vast literature which was developed by English
jurists, legal scholars and forensic physicians, is
meticulously explored. In the main this study is a
rambling, discursive examination of the grotesque
meandering and vacillation exhibited by English
juridical institutions in assessing the culpability,
labeling, treatment and disposition of the flawed
human beings who are caught up in the criminal
process. Out of the vast tangle of historical data,
documents, and courts records spanning some
seven hundred years, Walker brilliantly constructs
a record of human sang-froid which is reminiscent
of Raul Hilberg's masterful Destruction of the
European Jews in its depiction of the oppression
that is inevitable whenever men degrade and
dishonor their fellow men.
It would be absurd to attempt to bring together
in a brief review the major features of two millenia
of experience in the treatment of the mentally ill,
however, certain aspects of the issues raised in this
volume remain a vexing source of failure, and sug-
gest that our performance continues to be some-
what less than noble. Despite centuries of legalistic
debate and decades of research, the designation of
those subject to the insanity defense remains an
intellectual and social quagmire loaded with the
gibberish of the "right-wrong", "irresistible im-
pulse", "product of mental disease or defect" tests.
Otherwise, how can one explain the folly of an
event such as the recent Sirhan trial, and the
public spectacle which the psychiatric testimony
provided? Indeed, much of the psychiatric testi-
mony in that bizarre case sounded remarkably
similar to the direct and cross-examinations con-
ducted in many of the more notorious eighteenth
and nineteenth century trials which are set forth
in some detail in the Walker study.
The Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans recognized
the diminished responsibility of those individuals
not oriented in the major spheres of time, place, or
identity. In pre-Norman England the insane
person's kin would simply pay damages for any
injuries he might have done, and it was his relatives
who were to care for him and to control him. It was
not until 1800 that any formal arrangements were
made to care for "lunatics." Prior to this, it was his
property rather than his person which was of
greater interest to the state. In the fourteenth
1970]
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century it was the custom that "... the mayor
must see that his goods and chattels are taken and
given to his nearest friends to look after until he
recovers his sound mind. And his friends must
place a sufficient guard on the persons of such mad-
men as will ensure that they come to no harm or
loss and that they do no harm to others." By the
mid-eighteen century private madhouses had be-
come a profitable industry. Indeed, one of the
earliest "psychiatric" practioners, one William
Battie (sic) established his-leadership in the field
through the purchase of a seat on the board of
governors of Bethlem, the public asylum, for fifty
pounds in 1742. The same Battie, in addition to
acquiring his own private asylum wrote the defini-
tive Treatise on Madness, which included the pre-
scription for a number of crude therapies still in use
in some of the backwaters of medicine. The degree
to which occupational inheritance perpetuated the
asylum orientation is shown by the fact that a
dynasty of four generations of. the Monro family
superintended Bethlem for over a century. The use
of water as a "cure" and as torture, both for witch-
craft and mental illness is at once -nacabre and
incredible. Ducking in streams and ponds because
of faith in the curative properties of water was
common. Whipping, purges, emetics, cold baths,
electric shocks often hastened a patient's death.
But these barbarities die hard-some are still in
use as we all know, including the camisole rather
than chains. At one point, in a brief reference to
similarities in treatment of "witches" and the
mentally ill (pp. 47-48), Walker fails to follow up
an important lead as to the manner in which mental
illness and its treatment developed into an "in-
dustry" in a somewhat similar way that witch-
craft developed in continental Europe. Both be-
came a complex business which sustained the
livelihoods of a substantial number of people.
Vested interests in deviance of all kinds tend to
develop over a period of time (mental illness, drug
addiction, or witchcraft), creating systems of
deviance management and control which foster the
growth of an industry and an attendant bureau-
cratic apparatus for its nurture, and dependent
upon it for economic, political, psychic, religious,
or other forms of income.
ABkAm S. BLUMBERG
John Jay College
City University of New York
WmTE-COLLAR CRm NAL: THE OFFENEm IN
BusNxss AND THE PROFESSloNs. Edited, with
introductions and notes, by Gilbert Geis. New
York: Atherton Press, 1968. Pp. xii, 448. $8.50
When, some thirty years ago, Edwin H. Suther-
land in his presidential address to the American
Sociological Association proposed the idea of
"white collar crime", he gave a popular and expres-
sive name to a long known crime or criminal type.
White collar crimes, whatever they may mean,
have been committed in societies at all times ever
since wealthy and respectable members of the
upper socioeconomic class began engaging in occu-
pational activities. However, it was Edwin H.
Sutherland who stimulated contemporary atten-
tion in this class of crimes, and who launched the-
beginnings of a conceptual affair which, even after
the variety of studies of the last three decades, is
still not too far from its embryonic state. White
collar crime is perhaps one of the most chewed-over
concepts in the modem literature of criminology,
yet it is still not well understood. It has been
referred to mean a wide range of criminal phenom-
ena, from unethical business practices to serious
criminal offenses committed with the help of the
offender's socioeconomic power. Still, what white
collar crime-or the white collar criminal-really
means, remains vague and diffuse, but perhaps the-
fascination of the concept lies in the very com-
plexities of its character.
Even Sutherland himself, one may speculate,
was not too sure in how to define the concept he
proposed; probably, his main concern was only to
excite the students of criminology about an area of
criminal conduct, the study of which had been
rather neglected before. In the years after World
War II, the present reviewer from. a distance of
soine 6,000 miles, in the form of a long, pleasant,
and instructive correspondence (with the unavoid-
able partial assistance of translators) sought from
Sutherland the clarification of his idea at least on
two points; unfortunately no clear elucidation was
forthcoming up to the time when the exchange of
letters had to be terminated. Later communication
with Sutherland was prevented by his untimely
death to the immeasurable loss of this reviewer,
and the available literature on white collar crime is
not seen to be extended to the two discussed issues
which can be posed still without guiding answer.
First, is the white-collar-concept a reference to a
specific type of crime, or to a specific class of
criminals, or jointly to both, or, as was suggested to
Sutherland by this reviewer, is it a specific method
of crime where the criminal's socioeconomic power
.[Vol. 61
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is used as one of the instruments whereby the
ordinary course of criminal justice is hoped to be
avoided. Second, is the criminal's socioeconomic
power an absolute condition referring exclusively to
the upper strata of society, or, as it was suggested
to Sutherland, can it be interpreted in its relative
sense, thus to be applied to any social group where
the criminal, regardless of his wealth and respecta-
bility in the whole society, has a given social or
economic power over the other members of the
group. These are but two unanswered questions of
many which challenge the theoretical literature
and research for the better understanding of
Sutherland's provocative idea. The great merit of
Gilbert Geis's book is that it is a major response
to this call.
Geis's book is a firework display of essays on
white collar crime, and is unique in offering a
sophisticated presentation of the most important
material published in the past regarding this aspect
of crime. It brings to the reader thirty-two studies,
organized into six parts. The first part deals with
"What Is 'White-Collar Crime'?", and the discus-
sion of the essays here, making efforts to clarify the
concept, has a continuation in the concluding sixth
part of the book which treats the "Controversy
Regarding the Concept of Vvhite-Collar Crime".
These two ends of the contents leave the factual or
more specific studies, gathered in four parts, be-
tween the two theoretical parts of the book, prob-
ably to build up the controversial impressions for
the last group of essays. Given the complexity of
the concept, the book necessarily covers much
familiar ground, but one of the editor's virtues is
that he brings out clearly the three decades-long
struggle for a clearer understanding of what white
collar crime means or should mean. From Geis's
own words in the book one has to assume that the
important role that the controversial question of
definition plays throughout the many articles in
this volume by various authors, has been delib-
erately designed by the editor; in so doing, Geis
performed a commendable service to knowledge.
If some authors tried to identify white collar
crime with "economic crimes" or with "occupa-
tional crimes", this is not Sutherland's blame,
whose hesitant conceptualization did not go so far,
nor can these attempts be attributed to Geis, who
obviously disagrees with this extension of the con-
cept. But it is Geis's merit that he called attention
even to those who seem to have taken Sutherland's
idea perhaps somewhat too lightly, and who tried
to squeeze in themes which seem to belong to other
spheres of criminal law and would make the original
thought totally diffuse and slippery.
The four parts of the book between the two
theoretical ends follow disciplined guidelines, and
the selection of the essays is expertly and carefully
handled. In fact, the material has been welded
together in such a way that it creates a new book
out of the separate elements. The second part treats
the "Corporate and Business White-Collar Crime",
and the third the "Commercial and Professional
White-Collar Crime". The fourth part views white
collar criminality from the other end of the spec-
trum: it presents essays on "White-Collar Ex-
ploitation and Its Victims"; and, finally, the fifth
part turns to "White-Collar Offenses and the Legal
Process". Throughout these four parts the papers
not only represent an excellently organized
anthology, but also appear as a colorful snapshot
of a crisis in the problem of American crime that
does not cease to trouble our social and economic
life.
No review of this book would be complete with-
out bringing the fact into prominence that Gilbert
Geis not only presented other authors' material
with scholarship and intelligence, but also intro-
duced the collection with his own significant essay
where he devotes the opening pages of the book to a
reasoned and forceful exposition of Sutherland's
concept. His apparent emphasis on the analytical
impasse, and the presentation of the major faults
and fascinations. of the concept of white collar
crime have in themselves made this book justified.
It is easy to enjoy this book; and yet, it is un-
satisfying. But this is not Geis's fault; the awful
truth behind white collar crimes has to be blamed
for that. This book is a timely reminder of a repul-
sively dark side of crime that highlights one of the
depressing paradoxes of society, regardless of its
social and economic structure. This is not to mean
that the use of socioeconomic power for criminal
purposes is to be accepted as if it were a natural
part of social life; it only suggests that white collar
criminality is not an exclusively American phe-
nomenon, and it also disturbs other social and
economic structures.
Although three decades have gone by since the
late Professor Sutherland called attention to the
contemporary American expressions of this crime
type, the actuality of the theoretical and practical
problem is not yet stilled. Perhaps the problem is
even further from resolution than before. The very
fact that Gilbert Geis, with this book, aroused
again attention to this demanding issue, and done
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TRAVAUX DU XV" COURS INTERNATIONAL DE
CRUHNOLOGIE (Proceedings of the XVIth Inter-
national Course in Criminology), International
Society of Criminology. Paris, France: Pichon,
1968. Pp. 802. $12.00.
This book reproduces papers delivered in
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, Africa, 12-24 September,
1966, at the Sixteenth International Course in
Ciiminology. This course is sponsored annually by
the International Society of Criminology (in a
different country each time).
The book is divided into five groups of papers:
law and criminology, psychiatry, psychology and
criminology, sociology and criminology, and
penology.
The broader division is the one between papers
given by criminologists living outside Africa and
those living in Africa. The former group of papers
are not very interesting because they simply re-
state theoretical concepts and facts which pertain
to Occidental criminology and which are current
nowadays. The contribution made by the authors
of these papers are thus very limited, even more so
when you consider that half of these papers had
already been published elsewhere -before.
The "African papers" are the most pertinent
because they bring to light materials that are very
scarce since almost no criminological study have
been done in underdeveloped countries. These
papers are original and constitute 20 of the 46
papers included in the proceedings.
Statistical studies are given about the state of
delinquency and criminality in general in Africa
as well as in particular countries of the Continent.
The political, social and economic aspects of crime
are fully discussed with regard to underdeveloped
countries.
Prevention, the police system, forensic sciences,
and the penitentiary system are given particular
attention.
Finally, the teaching of criminology and the state
of criminological research in Africa are discussed
and the usual conclusion is heard: "we do not have
enough people specialized in the field who could
organize an integrated system of criminal justice."
This conclusion may not apply exclusively to
underdeveloped countries.., because which Occi-
dental country can really boast of such an inte-
grated system?
May we conclude by saying that the present
book with its 800 pages could have been reduced to
the 300 pages of the "African papers" and would
then have been an excellent contribution. The
printing savings thus made could have been de-
voted to help criminological research in Africa....
ANDRE NoiNDADu
Department of Criminology,
University of Montreal
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